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A user-layered approach for modelling and simulating terrorist attacks 
Abstract 
Modelling and simulation techniques offer a comprehensive method for assessing the impact 
of a terrorist attack, allowing multiple scenarios to be simulated with ease without imposing 
extensive time or cost constraints. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive model 
for the different categories of users who are likely to be involved in the modelling and 
simulation of a terrorist attack. It focuses on assessing protection measures for 
implementation within a single building. It takes into account the different types of threat 
(biological, chemical and explosive) which may occur within or around such a target 
infrastructure. It considers that a specific company may be required to invest in one or more 
protection technologies to reduce the risk of an attack occurring, be it a single threat or a 
combination of threats.  
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Introduction 
Research into the prevention of terrorist attacks has been a focal point over the past decade, 
due to the perceived risk of terrorist attacks, both at home and overseas. The capability to 
assess the risk of these attacks and the effectiveness of security measures within the 
environment is necessary from both the planning and response perspectives. The recent 
‘Exercise Forward Defence’ drill staged in 2012 in London prior to the Olympic Games, 
which simulated an explosive attack on the London Underground, provides an example of 
how one nation perceives the importance of early detection and quick response (“Major 
exercise in central London - Metropolitan Police Service,” 2012). The simulation of attacks 
in such a manner is limited due to cost, time and cognitive constraints. The aim of this 
research is to develop an approach for modelling and simulation of terrorist attacks which 
overcome these constraints, yet allows the involvement and interaction of different 
stakeholders within the simulation of such an attack. 
 
Various methods have been developed which consider computer modelling and simulation 
techniques aimed at reducing cost, time and cognitive constraints. This allows prospective 
attack scenarios to be evaluated quickly and easily, with the potential to take into account 
terrorist decision-making, considering threats to critical infrastructure resulting from both 
cataclysmic threats, and gradual and undetectable events that build up over time (Calida and 
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Katina, 2012). Among such techniques are: agent based modelling, game theory and discrete 
event simulation. 
 
Agent based modelling (ABM) represents a system as a collection of autonomous decision-
making entities (i.e. software objects) called agents. Each agent individually assesses its 
situation and makes decisions on the basis of a set of rules (Bonabeau, 2002). Agent based 
models have been used to simulate and analyse interaction-based attack scenarios (Mysore et 
al., 2006) (Carley et al., 2006) (Bulleit, 2005), by allowing agents to interact with each other 
and their perceived virtual environment (Lucas et al., 2007). Applications of ABM to counter 
terrorism include simulating the effect of an attack on a city, focusing on both chemical 
(Mysore et al., 2006) and biological (Carley et al., 2006) attacks. Multi-agent simulations can 
be used within the security sector as an insight into the execution of high-resolution 
simulations, such as war-gaming (Lucas et al., 2007). One of the benefits offered by ABM is 
that it allows “analysts to quickly build, run and analyse many thousands of simulation 
experiments over a broad range of input variables” (Lucas et al., 2007). One disadvantage of 
ABM is that the effects of the interactions between agents are uncertain, meaning that it is 
difficult to make predictions about the system’s interactions. Furthermore both the nature and 
the outcome of an interaction cannot be determined at the beginning of a request (Jennings 
and Wooldridge, 2000). 
 
Another use of simulations is achieved by using human beings to recreate (to varying levels 
of granularity) the circumstances and decision-making process both prior to, during and in the 
aftermath of a terrorist event (Abhayaratne and Ackerman, 2004). Abhayaratne and 
Ackerman (2004) (working on the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism 
Research Project at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the US) 
completed a literature review of manned gaming and simulations of terrorist threats that 
involve WMD. They investigated roleplaying for entertainment purposes (and how these 
provide valuable contributions for simulating terrorism in general), wargaming the terrorism 
threat (towards simulating terrorist attack planning and implementation rather than response 
efforts) and terrorism response exercises (the best practices of these). Brennan (2002) 
highlighted one limitation of wargaming as its lack of applicability for analysing the 
effectiveness of deploying resources, and how this preparation would reduce the 
consequences of such attacks. He suggested that wargames established the effects that attacks 
on homeland would have on the deployment process only temporarily, but that very little was 
done to examine the second- and third-order consequences.  
 
Further studies have investigated modelling terrorist attacks as a discrete event simulation 
(DES) (Wan, 2007)(Sung et al., 2005). DES consists of a collection of techniques that when 
applied to a discrete-event dynamical system, generates sequences called sample paths that 
characterize its behaviour (Fishman, 2001). It assumes that each event occurs at an instant in 
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time and marks a change of state in the system. Wan (2007) extends this to cover dynamic, 
asymmetric threat behaviours, enabling the simulation of a wide range of maritime threat 
scenarios. He uses a discrete-event simulation to simulate a typical port threat response 
model, testing the adaptive response of asymmetric threats in reaction to port security 
procedures. He supplements this with a multi-agent system to provide complex adaptive 
behaviours for the different threats. 
 
Modelling and simulation (M&S) techniques offer a comprehensive method for assessing an 
attack, allowing multiple scenarios to be simulated with ease without imposing extensive 
time or cost constraints. However, to date they do not consider the different types of user that 
are likely to access the software. Sung et al. (2005) do however, suggest an approach which 
considers two layers of developers within the creation of a war game model: M&S experts, 
and domain experts. They aim to address the fact that M&S experts do not generally have a 
deep knowledge of the system to be modelled. Sung et al. provide a framework which allows 
the M&S experts to develop a war game using DES, representing abstract behaviour of an 
object, and the domain experts to use an object model to detail the object. It provides a mean 
for allowing domain experts to first analyse the system specification using UML and then 
M&S experts to transform this for DES. 
 
Popken (1990) creates a computer model that is designed to be used over time to address a 
fixed set of repetitive problems for airbase logistics within a simulation environment. It 
ensures that users do not have to recreate a new model for every problem, by adjusting out 
the input data and certain parameters. Military systems and terrorist attacks alike are 
complicated to model because of their large scale and scope. In order to address this problem 
Popken uses the four-level user concept which assumes that at one end of the scale are pure 
model users (with no training in M&S, but who can complete simple analysis with a given 
model) and at the other end are model developers (“with the requisite background to use 
models, build models, or given enough time, modify existing simulation models” (Popken, 
1990)). Level 1: the user level, we assume requires the least amount of expertise. It allows the 
user to perform single parametric studies with a predefined simulation model and statistical 
analysis tools. Level 2: the analyst level allows specific objects to be selected from an object-
oriented component library. Level 3: the developer level allows building, testing and 
validation of new M&S objects for lower levels. New objects are defined as specializations of 
already existing object classes. Level 4: the utility level provides access to the underlying 
software environment (i.e. the program coding). Popken focuses on military problems and the 
large, complex systems surrounding this. His M&S environment is based solely on the level 
of M&S expertise that a user has, and does not account for the different interactions that they 
may wish to experience with the software. For example, his work does not consider how 
different individuals interacting with the system may require different information and tools 
relating to a military problem. Furthermore there is no detail about the interactions between 
each of the levels of user, assuming that they act on a standalone basis. 
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To our knowledge there exist no M&S software publications on terrorist attacks concerning 
potential different user groups of the software, each with different requirements. The focus of 
this paper is therefore to identify such an approach, based on the development of the tool-
target approach for modelling a terrorist attack, outlined by Le Sage, Borrion and Toubaline 
(2012). The tool-target approach implemented by the authors combines DES with ABM 
techniques to simulate various sequences of discrete events. Inspired by the principle of 
action and reaction, the methodology proposes that every change in state happens because a 
tool (an item used to achieve a tool, without being consumed in the process) impacts upon a 
target (the object of attention), and that the system evolves into another state according to a 
probability distribution (Le Sage et al., 2012). The target environment is divided into tri-
dimensional zones. Interfaces connect two contiguous zones, and paths are defined between 
them. The typological network is modelled by introducing nodes in the middle of these paths. 
At each node, a number of pre-specified actions (processes) can occur. The model can be 
used to provide relatively realistic determination of the risk of potential terrorist attacks 
modelled as dynamically changing scenarios. It allows existing and hypothetical security 
systems to be integrated easily, and allows the determination of risk of a malfunctioning 
security system to be estimated. 
 
The methodology presented within this paper is based on a user-layered approach which has 
been applied to the model described above. The aim is to provide a comprehensive model for 
the different levels of users who are likely to be involved in the M&S of a terrorist attack. 
The proposed design is a multi-layered approach which uses client-server architecture. A 
major advantage of a client-server architecture is the separation of affairs, thus enhancing 
modifiability as the “presentation, business and data management logic are all clearly 
encapsulated. Each can have its internal logic modified in many cases without changes 
rippling into other tiers” (Gorton, 2011) (modifiability), high performance and scalability. 
However upon the implementation of such an approach the security threats to the client-
server system must be considered. Client-server security problems can arise due to (i) 
physical security holes (when an individual gains unauthorised access to an individual’s 
computer by obtaining their user name and password); (ii) software security holes (resulting 
from a bug in the software which may compromise the system into giving wrong 
performance); or (iii) inconsistent usage holes (when two different usages of a system 
contradict over security point) (Yadav and Singh, 2009). Threats to the server should be 
considered within this implementation, and ways in which these threats can be minimised 
effectively addressed. 
 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol was designed to allow client-server applications 
to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering or message 
forgery (Dierks, 2008). The protocol uses data encryption and integrity checks to provide 
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connection security, and can be used for encapsulation of higher level protocols. Since the 
introduction of this protocol much work has been completed into ensuring the security of 
client-server architectures (Wu and Tseng, 2010) (Jain et al., 2012) (Bloch et al., 2008). Lien 
et al. (2011) aim to integrate security considerations in client-server architectures of health 
information systems. This they achieve by specifying logical rules for security system 
requirements. Based on these rules they incorporate security control components at different 
points in the system architecture.  
 
The remainder of this paper considers the design of a user-layered approach within the tool-
target based methodology developed by Le Sage et al. (2012) for modelling and simulating a 
terrorist attack. It will first seek to identify the requirements of the individuals associated with 
the M&S process, and then propose a solution to incorporate these individuals and their 
individual requirements through a client-server platform. 
 
The modelling and simulation software user groups 
The proposed methodology focuses on assessing protection measures for implementation 
within a single building. It takes into account the different types of threat (biological, 
chemical and explosive) which may occur within or around such a target infrastructure. It 
takes into account the nodal network of the building, which can be modelled according to the 
building floor plan, and the objects within the structure. It considers that a specific company 
may be required to invest in one or more protection technologies to reduce the risk of an 
attack occurring, be it a single threat or a combination of threats. 
 
Scenario-based design was employed to allow users and developers to work together to 
determine the requirements of a system. Scenario-based design is “a family of techniques in 
which the use of a future system is concretely described at an early point in the development 
process. Narrative descriptions of envisioned usage episodes are then employed in a variety 
of ways to guide the development of the system that will enable these use experiences” 
(Rosson and Carroll, 2002). A scenario describes an expected or supposed sequence of 
actions. The scenario-based design approach focuses on the operational modelling of the 
system. 
 
The framework that has been adopted for the scenario-based design is represented in Figure 
1. It was adapted from Rosson and Carroll (2002). The initial step in the proposed framework 
was to analyse stakeholders’ needs and their claims about current practice, to enable the 
problem scenarios to be generated. Once this problem scenario is created, detailing the 
context and a set of goals, it can be combined with a collection of background information 
and used as an input to generate the activity scenarios. Activity scenarios focus on how to 
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address the goals of the actors in the problem scenario, and are generated by the stakeholders 
of the project. These activity scenarios can then be combined with analysis of the information 
security requirements and used to develop conceptual models. After the conceptual models 
are established, the user interface can be developed, through the use of information and 
interaction scenarios. Upon the completion of the user interface development the prototype 
can be created and evaluated by stakeholders against the usability specification. 
 
 
Figure 1: Adaptation of the Structured Scenario-Based Design Method model. 
The scenarios used as a basis for this method of design consist of the following; a setting or 
situation state, one or more actors with personal motivations, knowledge and capabilities, and 
tools and objects that the actors can manipulate (Rosson and Carroll, 2002). 
 
The user groups were selected such that they broadly represented the potential users of attack 
M&S software. The groups included the head of security for Company X, security 
consultants, security design and maintenance teams and software developers. The head of 
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security for an organisation aims to maintain a safe and secure environment for all users of 
the building by establishing and enforcing security policies and procedures, and overseeing 
the processes and their functioning. Security consultants specialise in security analysis, 
determining the needs of organisations on an individual basis. They are responsible for 
tailoring security systems to suit an individual organisation, and propose the overall system 
architecture for the security. Security system designers are responsible for designing and 
manufacturing technological security systems, which can be tailored to individual 
organisations, and maintenance teams are responsible for the installation and carrying out any 
planned or unplanned maintenance required. Software developers are responsible for 
developing information systems for the analysis of security risk in an organisation, i.e. 
designing, developing and possibly installing software solutions.  
 
Three scenarios were drawn up to highlight the requirement for the user layered approach: 
Activity scenario 1: The head of security for Company X wishes to install a new security 
system to meet the requirements of his organisation. He wants to install 
the optimal product to ensure control over the assets of the 
organisation. As such he employs a security consultant to analyse 
which product he should install. The security consultant must liaise 
with the product developer to ascertain the specification of each 
product, thus allowing him to analyse the conformity to the 
organisation’s requirements. 
Activity scenario 2: A new premises is being developed and the security consultant must 
determine what security measures should be installed to provide the 
“optimal” security, without compromising the organisation’s 
requirements. They must liaise with the product developers to obtain 
the system specifications, and must analyse how the different measures 
can be used in cohesion. 
Activity scenario 3: A problem has arisen with the security system in place at Company X. 
The head of security makes the decision to call out the maintenance 
team. The maintenance team must assess the security system and 
produce a report highlighting the problems. The report must be 
analysed by a security consultant to determine whether Company X 
should keep the current security system in place, or replace it with an 
alternative security solution. 
 
 
The requirement for a database management system 
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In order to achieve their goals the different users must be able to interact with, and access 
information provided by, the other users. Figure 2 illustrates how the software developer 
(who is part of a software development company) must be able to interact with the external 
security consultant. The software developer will request additional generic components 
which are required within the software. 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction between the different user groups. 
 
In turn the target organisation communicates with the security consultant at the consultancy 
company to specify any further information that they require within the model. The security 
system development companies provide the head of security with specifications for actual or 
conceptual security designs, which they would like to assess the effectiveness of. The head of 
security communicates with the security system development company in order to obtain the 
information required with regards to the security system specifications. The information 
provided by the consultancy company and the security system design teams are combined to 
allow the head of security to simulate the risk of an attack occurring. 
 
To facilitate this process and the communication between the different levels, the information 
may be stored and accessed from a central server. The information required throughout the 
process includes elements of the tool-target approach, the building floor plan, threats, the 
network model of the building, the building ecosystem and script progression probabilities, 
and can be seen in Figure 3. The developer is required to have access to the elements of the 
tool-target based approach, including the different classes and the attributes and functions 
associated with each class. The security consultant needs access to the target specific floor 
plan, and a database containing the threats which they can configure for the assignment. They 
use this information to aid in the construction of the nodal network of the building, define the 
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objects within the building and the state of these objects (for example, all doors are left open), 
and determine the probability of progression along the script. Ultimately, this information 
allows the security system design team to choose the appropriate security solution for the 
specific scenario. The same information is required by the head of security for Company X, 
but with an updated nodal network of the building, building ecosystem and script progression 
probabilities, to include the proposed security solution. 
 
Figure 3: Information required by each user group 
 
Analysing the information security requirements of the system 
The information security requirements of the system were analysed concurrently with the 
problem scenario to obtain security classifications for each level. “Information security 
classification is a fundamental step in protecting against the risks associated with 
unauthorized disclosure, use or loss of […] assets. All security countermeasures to protect the 
information are determined by its security classification level” (Information Security 
Classification Framework, 2010). Three levels of sensitivity have been defined within this 
paper, adapted from, and in line with the Information Security Classification Framework 
(Information Security Classification Framework, 2010): High sensitivity, medium sensitivity 
and low sensitivity. 
 
Information ranked as having a “High” security classification is deemed to provide essential 
information for a terrorist planning an attack. Such information would include crisis 
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communication during emergencies and provincial response plans and logs, target specific 
intelligence and information systems used for testing essential services. Information ranked 
as having a “Medium” security classification would provide information to terrorists which 
may be useful in planning an attack, but which would not be of much use as a standalone 
component without additional resources to accompany it. For example, evacuation and 
emergency response plans for a specific target would only be useful if the offender could 
relate this to a specific target infrastructure. The lowest level of security classification would 
contain information which could reasonably be expected to provide little or no assistance to 
an offender. This would include material suitable for public release, operational procedures 
related to non-critical activities and public education materials. 
 
The above provides a platform for determining the most critical aspects of information to 
protect in the client-server design. Threats to the server include eavesdropping (silently 
listening to the data over the network in order to obtain a transcript of the network activity 
and thus obtain sensitive information, such as password, data and procedures for performing 
functions) and denial of service (damaging a resource such that it cannot be used) (Yadav and 
Singh, 2009). A client-server architecture must be implemented which takes into 
consideration these threats when considering the building floor plan and the nodal network of 
the building. 
 
Designing a client-server architecture 
The model is based on a 2-tier client-server architecture pattern, which allows the client to 
talk directly with the server. It separates the user interface and data logic onto one computer 
(tier 1) and the database server onto another computer (tier 2). Data logic is defined as “the 
set of rules and specifications that data or queries must meet before being submitted to the 
database server. The data logic tier may also include calculation, data analysis or anything 
that does not specifically relate to the user interface” (Hemmer, 1997). The server stores four 
individual databases as illustrated in Figure 4; the main, target specific, security system and 
high-level repositories. 
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Figure 4: Client-server approach for attack modelling and simulation software. 
 
The developer client has access to the main repository, which stores information relating to 
the generic components of the software. The main repository is not considered to be security 
sensitive, as it does not detail any information pertaining to individual structures – this level 
provides the platform for the implementation. The information from the main repository is 
fed into the base level executable. The executable allows the developer to format the structure 
of the HMI, and to implement and make adjustments to the objects within the tool-target 
based approach. For example, the developer may feel that it is necessary to create a new class 
entitled “alarm”, along with associated attributes and functions. This would allow scenarios 
to be simulated encompassing these attributes and functions. An example scenario could be 
as follows; an individual will attempt to park a motorcycle near an assembly point. A few 
minutes later, they will enter into the building and attempt to trigger the fire alarm in order to 
cause an evacuation of the building. The motorcyclist intends to trigger the device when a 
crowd will have gathered at the assembly point. 
 
The results from the base level executable are passed to the target specific repository. The 
security consultant also inputs information into the target specific repository. The security 
consultant is responsible for inputting information with regards to the target infrastructure, 
including the layout of the building and the types of threats which are to be considered. The 
target specific repository contains sensitive information with regards to the individual 
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infrastructure to be studied. Dependent on the sensitivity of this information it is therefore 
recommended that the server is created as a local server, with access limited to one PC. In 
order to achieve this, the results from the base level executable would have to be stored in an 
intermediary on the server, allowing the security consultants access to this, such that they can 
compile this within their on-site target specific repository. The data stored in the target 
specific repository is passed to the target specific executable. This software allows the 
security consultant to calibrate the target system, and to mark out the nodal network which 
the crime scripts are to be simulated on. The target specific configuration, combined with the 
general configuration, is passed to the security system repository, which is accessible by the 
security system design team. At this level the design team input data with regards to the 
security systems which are to be implemented within the target building. The security system 
repository may also be stored on a local server to prevent unauthorised access to the data. 
 
Finally, all of the above information is transferred into the high level repository, which is 
connected to a read only executable. Using the repository and the executable the head of 
security is able to simulate crime scripts to provide insight with regards to the implementation 
of varying security systems within their building, and furthermore the effects of the potential 
malfunctioning of each of these security systems. The architecture described must be 
converted into a platform for implementation, taking into consideration how the system will 
cover security implementation measures. The outline for the implementation of this platform 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
A platform for implementation 
The user will log themself into the client through the RIBS login interface component by 
entering an ID number and password. If they are successful in passing the authentication 
function then they proceed to the interface of the attack simulation software as outlined in 
Figure 5, otherwise their login is rejected. The attack simulation software component then 
accesses data from a database located in the server site, dependent on the access level granted 
to the individual. This server site may be situtated within a local host to limit the potential 
security breaches within the system. This would only be effective if the different users are 
located within a similar geographical area, or for high-value targets the different users are 
willing to travel to a central location to compile and exchange repositories. In the event that 
the users are not located within a similar geogrpahical area then the security of transmission 
between the client and the server must be considered. It is envisaged that the client-server 
transmission will be protected with TLS, and additional privacy controls  including audit 
trails and encryption. 
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Figure 5: Client-server platform for implementation 
 
Conclusion 
The method proposed within this paper describes a user-layered approach developed for the 
implementation of terrorist attack M&S software. It allows multiple stakeholders involved in 
the development and implementation of security systems to interface with a single modelling 
environment, each with their own prescribed needs. It accounts for the different levels of 
technical expertise which exist amongst the different stakeholders, and the interactions that 
must be facilitated between the groups. It considers opportunities for assessing how new 
security systems could reduce vulnerability, and the effect that a malfunctioning security 
system may have on the risk of an attack occurring. It addresses the problem that one user is 
unlikely to have all the knowledge required to implement such a platform, aiming to create a 
comprehensive and representative solution. 
 
Four different stakeholders of the software have been identified: the software developers, the 
security consultant, the security product manufacturer and the head of security for a particular 
company. It has been proposed that in order to effectively assess the implementation of new 
security technologies, all four groups of stakeholders are required to have an input. As such 
the software developer would be responsible for ensuring that the underlying software 
environment is configured correctly. The security consultant would configure the software to 
ensure that it is specific to a given company. The security product manufacturer would 
provide the specifications required for the new security system implementation which is to be 
tested, and the head of security would be responsible for assessing the overall effectiveness of 
this new security system within his building. It thus aids in the organisation’s acquisition of 
appropriate security solutions, and that they are procured at the best possible cost to meet the 
needs of the organisation (in terms of quality and quantity, time, and location). In order to 
ensure that such technology is tested effectively, without actual implementation, 
communication is required across the different layers of stakeholders. This is enabled by the 
implementation of a client-server approach which accounts for the possible different 
geographical locations of the stakeholders. The aim of the platform is to integrate security 
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concerns into the client-server architecture. One limitiation of the approach is the perceived 
security threat to the stakeholders involved due to the fact that they are sharing their 
information across a server. A solution has been proposed which would mean that the most 
sensitivie information is not shared on the server, and is made available locally to the 
required parties. Further work required will include the implementation and testing of the 
platform. User testing will be set up to validate the efficiency of the proposed system. 
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